“Security prior to 9/11 was more about cargo theft and pilferage than it was about access control and knowing who’s coming in and out of our terminals and facilities,” but after 9/11, “there was a paradigm shift in terms of security.” |
Seaport Security
Before
Before the 9/11 attacks, port security was as it currently exists was unheard of. Port security was only maintained to check for contraband and counterfeit products, never as a measure of fighting terrorism. Terrorism was not even a considered factor when cargo ships were undergoing routine checks or when freighters were inspected for illegal substances. Many ports, including the Port Authority in New York and New Jersey did not have security professionals and were monitered by tradional crime police. Tactical security and law enfrocement was more important than strategy.
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This is a September 2011 video podcast by the Port of Long Beach, describing the feelings during 9/11. Click on the picture to watch more.
After
The 9/11 attacks completely changed how port security was prioritized. With a rapid new focus on fighting terrorism in the U.S. government, previously unchecked cargo now has to be inspected in great detail. Huge oversea transport containers now have the potential to carry explosives, illegally bought weapons, and many other items that could aid terrorist groups operating within the United States. These containers now have to be checked for unauthorized items, and national security in U.S. ports has to be maintained through new security measures that have been implemented since 9/11. These policies have helped to shape the post-9/11 concern for container security as well as port security itself.
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New Legislation Regarding Ports
The Maritame Transportation Security Act of 2002 was signed by President Bush and went into effect in 2004. It introduced sweeping port security changes. Among the changes were:
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Funding also increased for U.S seaports after the Security and Accountability for Every Port Act in 2006. It was implemented to add even more security and to track passenger and cargo movement. . The Department of Homeland Security has slowly taken to sending money and funds into each port.
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"Coordinating 190 private companies and 50 or 60 federal, state and local agencies was very difficult, but we achieved it through the Area Maritime Security Committee," she said. "We took another step through this committee and wrote what we called the Portwide Strategic Emergency Management Plan." It was completed about four years ago and allowed the entities to stop competing for funding and focus on the port's most serious security risks."
Bethann Rooney, the manager of port security for The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey
Port Access
In the 12 years since the 9/11 attacks, one of the biggest changes in the seaports is access. All workers for seaports must carry specific credentials in order to gain access to their waterfront jobs under the MTSA. These port credentials cannot be obtained easily, and workers must go through background checks, health tests, and immigration inspections before receiving authorization at the seaports. Crews bringing cargo into ports as well as those who actually work on the land are subject to strict inspection with the new security measures. It is also much more difficult for the cargo itself to gain access into the ports, as inspections for weapons and other illegal objects that could benefit terrorists are very common now, and were unheard of before the 9/11 attacks.
"In the last 10 years we have implemented C-TPAT, we've implemented the 24-hour rule, 10+2, significant port security measures, protecting ports themselves. We've implemented radiation screening. We've implemented extensive targeting of all containers. The sum total of that is that today you do not hear the same level of political noise around containers. There's a comfort level."
-Peter Tirschwell, senior VP at the Journal on Commerce |
Trouble in the Ports
The GAO (Government Accountability Office) noted that many security programs are slowed by irregular funding, delays in developing requirements, and weak management. There are no measures in place to evaluate effectiveness of security programs, the agency said, and the TWIC (Transportation Workers Identification Credential) program remains merely a flashpass until new readers are required to read the credential and verify the holder’s identity. DHS is also re-evaluating the idea of scanning all containers arriving in the U.S. |
The Port Security Grant Program is also problematic. “While monies have been distributed, the program has suffered from a number of problems,” Caldwell said. “Program management moved among different agencies, which reduced long-term accountably. The procedures of awarding funds were complex, leading to unspent funds. And finally, there has been little progress determining what the billions of dollars actually bought.”
Excerpts from an article by Elaine Rundle, Strategy and Leadership in Critical Times: Emergency Management